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EASTERN ENTERPRISES AS THE CANARY IN THE
COALMINE: WILL THE SUPREME COURT
HAMPER THE GULF WORKFORCE BY
CONTINUING TO CONFUSE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RETROACTIVE
LIABILITY PROVISIONS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Judges could admit, fully and frankly, that they create and enforce
unenumerated constitutional rights.... Alternatively, federal judges
could get out of the business of amending the Constitution by judicial
fiat. This would mean that... Eastern Enterprisesv. Apfel I should be
abandoned. If history provides any guidance,
2 the justices are virtually
certain not to follow such a course of action.

On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon exploded, causing
eleven workers to lose their lives and millions of gallons of oil to spill
into the Gulf of Mexico. 3 The spill was by far the worst in American
history.4 Analysts predict that the disaster could cost up to $100 billion.'

While this figure on its face seems astronomical, even that pales in
comparison to the suffering of victims and loss of livelihood. As a
social worker who works with fishermen's wives noted "[t]he oil spill is
like a cancer or tumor,.... [i]t is creeping and unpredictable from
whether people will have livelihoods or health issues later from helping

1. 524 U.S.498 (1998).
2. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Wages of Crying Wolf Revisited. The Essential
Consanguinityof Lochner, Roe, and Eastern Enterprises, I GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 133, 133-34
(2002).
3. See Campbell Robertson & Leslie Kaufman, Size of Spill in Gulf of Mexico is Larger
Than Thought, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/us/29spill.html.
4. Bradley Blackburn & Matt Gutman, BPOil.piI
Wo inUS IfH'o MA'OiaI St
Don, ABCNEWs.0.OM, May 27, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/Media/bp-oil-leak-now-worsthistory-surpassing-exxon/story?id=1 0759905.
5. Alex Spillius, BP Oil Spill Could Cost $100bn, THE TELEGRAPH, June 18, 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/7836982/BP-oil-spill-couldcost-1OObn.html.
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6
clean it up. You just don't know whether it is benign or malignant."
Shortly after oil began pouring into the Gulf of Mexico, much
attention turned to whether the American legal system would be able to
fairly compensate those who suffered as a result of this unprecedented
ecological disaster. Unfortunately, the answer may have been no as
Congress included a provision in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), a
law passed after the Exxon Valdez spill, that limited an offshore oil
vessel owner's liability to $75 million per incident.7 Considering the
almost unimaginable destruction wrought by BP, $75 million is
"laughable., 8 In an effort to correct this deficiency, the House added a
provision to the proposed Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic
Resources Act (CLEAR Act) (a bill whose original purpose was to
reorganize the federal energy regulatory system) that would eliminate
the OPA's $75 million damages cap.9 This provision would apply
retroactively to cover the April 20, 2010 spill. 10 On July 30, 2010, the
House of Representatives passed the CLEAR Act by a vote of 209 to
193." Unfortunately, the Senate has yet to vote on this legislation, and
likely never will.12
There are numerous reasons why this is so, one of which is the fact
that BP has been successful in creating the impression that it is willing to
take responsibility for the spill.' 3 In the wake of the spill, BP pledged
that it would contribute $20 billion to a victim compensation fund
administered by the government.14 Furthermore, BP representatives
stated that the company would disregard the OPA's $75 million damages
cap.' 5 Despite BP's apparent willingness to be a responsible corporate
citizen, there remains reason to be skeptical about its statements. For
example, until a federal judge required BP to put in writing its pledge to

6.
Toll,

Dana Hedgpeth & David A. Fahrenthold, Apparent Suicide May Add to the Oil Spill's
WASH.

POST,

June

24,

2010,

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/24/politics/washingtonpost/main6613826.shtml.
7.

See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2006).

8.

156 CONG. REC. H6498 (daily ed. July 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Holt).

9. See Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2009, H.R. 3534, 11 1th
Cong. § 702(a)(1)(B) (2010).

10. Id. § 702(b).
11. H.R. 3534 [111"], GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 111-3534
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
12. See id.The Act has been stalled in the Senate since July 30, 2010. Id.
13. See Harry R. Weber, BP Paying Dividends Seen as 'a Slap in the Face' toGulf Spill
Victims, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.hufingtonpost.com/2011/02/01/bp-paysdividends-upsetti_n 817121.html.
14. Id.
15. See id
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disregard the $75 million damages cap in the OPA, the company
appeared to waver on its commitment to fulfill this pledge. 16 The fact
that BP agreed to the judge's demand does not invalidate the concerns
addressed by the retroactive nature of the proposed CLEAR Act.17 BP
has a track record of broken promises and it is quite possible that BP
could find ways to circumvent its waiver. 18 In its written pledge, BP
chose its words carefully, agreeing to waive the damages cap only for
"legitimate claims."' 9 There remains a very real possibility that once the
outrage over the oil spill has dissipated, BP will argue that certain claims
are illegitimate, and thus its waiver should not apply. As such, Congress
should pass section 702 of the CLEAR Act with the retroactive
provision intact to not only ensure that oil companies are fully
responsible for spills in the future, but to prevent BP from finding
loopholes and escaping its obligations.
This Note will address whether a federal court would be likely to
overturn the retroactive provisions of the CLEAR Act. The issue of
retroactive liability has long troubled scholars and jurists alike. 20 As
Hebert Broom wrote in his legal maxim, "[r]etrospective laws are, as a
rule, of questionable policy, and contrary to the general principle that
legislation... ought not to change the character of past transactions
carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.",21 Despite retroactive
liability being disfavored, precedent overwhelmingly indicates that it is
constitutional. 22 However, given the current ideological makeup of the
Court, it is entirely possible, although unlikely, that this section of the
CLEAR Act could be struck down on takings and/or substantive due

16. Sabrina Canfield, Saying BP Has Paid 'Lots and Lots, 'Attorney Hedges on $75 Million
Cap,
COURTHOUSE
NEWS
SERVICE
(Oct,
15,
2010,
5:46
AM),
http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/10/15/31114.htm.
17. See id.
18.

See Ann Woolner, BP = Broken Promises, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 07, 2010,

http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10127/1056161-109.stm ("In a 2005 settlement with the federal
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, BP pledged to fix the multiple hazards that
exploded part of its Texas City refinery and killed 15 people. Four years later, OSHA alleged more
than 700 safety breaches, hundreds of them violations of the 2005 agreement, and proposed a record
$87.4 million fine.... In 2000, BP admitted dumping hazardous wastes onto Alaska's North Slope.
In 2001 it vowed to clean up air emitted from eight of its refineries in a settlement with the Justice
Department over Clean Air Act violations. And yet the Environmental Protection Agency cited one
of those plants, in Indiana, for polluting the air again in 2007").
19. See Stuart H. Smith, BP Formally Waives $75 Million Liability Cap and Positions Itself
for Legal Battle, STUART SMITH BLOG (Oct. 19, 2010), http://oilspillaction.com/breaking-news-bp-

formally-waives-75-million-liability-cap-and-positions-itself-for-legal-battle.
20. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 533 (1998).
21. Id. (citing H. BROOM, LEGAL MAxixS 24 (8h ed. 1911).
22. See Fern v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 580, 589 (1988).
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process grounds. In large part, this Note is an analysis of the potential
future of takings and substantive due process jurisprudence using the
CLEAR Act as a case study.
II. CURRENT

EVENTS AND THE LEGAL RESPONSE

A. DeepwaterHorizon Spill (Effects andLitigation)
When the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling unit exploded on
April 20, 2010,23 in addition to killing eleven workers, 24 it unleashed a
maelstrom of both massive environmental damage and long-lasting legal
ramifications.2 As BP attempts to both save face 26 and pass some of the
blame onto others, 27 they nonetheless are in the middle of what may
prove, when all the dust has settled, to be some of the most complicated
and perpetual litigation to arise under the OPA (and environmental law
generally).28
While the battle raging over the astronomical environmental
damages caused by the spill have received much of the media and public
attention, the rancor brewing beneath the murky surface may be the
long-term economic effects that the spill has on the Gulf and beyond.2 9
23. Robertson, supra note 3.
24. Id.
25. See Quinn Bowman, Oil Spill Liability a Complicated Legal Web, PBS ONLINE
NEWSHOUR, June 7, 2010, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/politics/jan-junel0/oillaw_0604.html.; see also Peter J. Henning, Looking for Liability in BP's Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, June 7, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/looking-for-liability-in-bpsgulf-oil-spill/.
26. See Texas Maritime Lawyers Support BP's Decision to Waive $75 Million Dollar Cap for
Some
Oil
Spill
Claims,
S.F.
CHRONICLE,
Oct.
22,
2010,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?fr-/g/a/2010/10/22/prwebprweb4687514.DTL;
see also
Smith, supra note 19. Note, waiver of the OPA $75 million damages cap was also done under
pressure of the court, and that the waiver was not unconditional, merely a waiver for all "legitimate"
claims, leaving open the very real possibility that BP will reassert its right to enforce the damages
cap against parties that they deem to be illegitimate. See id. Since BP has not directly addressed the
distinction between directly and indirectly harmed parties, it is possible that they may seek to utilize
the damages cap for all suits brought by indirectly harmed parties, an area that is already causing
considerable confusion in the legal community. See Rebecca Mowbroy, Indirect Economic
Damages From Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill can be Hard to Define, TIMES PICAYUNE, Aug. 2, 2010,
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/08/indirecteconomic-damages from.html;
see also Neil King Jr., Spill Damage Claims Absent the Spill, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703959704575453922212641454.html (discussing
possible claims by tourist communities throughout the gulf region, including areas in Florida which
never actually received a drop of oil on their shores).
27. Smith, supra note 19.
28. See Bowman, supra note 25.
29. See Catherine Clifford, BP's Lost-Wages List: Shrimpers, Crabbers-andReal-Estate
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The labor force in the gulf region (or at least a part of it), still suffering
from Hurricane Katrina's continuing fallout,3 ° may prove to be the group
left behind as claims and litigation are settled and time continues to
pass.3 '

The environmental concerns, as vast and important as they are, will
ultimately not result in as many legal disputes as the economic and labor
& employment concerns will. The OPA, discussed infra, sets strict
liability standards for all cleanup efforts after oil spills. 32 This type of
liability is not subject to the damages limitations enumerated in section
2704 of the Act, though economic damages, which include lost wages,3 3
are subject to section 2704 limitations.34
B. OPA Passedin the Wake of Valdez
A significant distinction exists between directly harmed parties and
indirectly harmed parties, as it relates to each group's potential ability to
bring claims under the varying causes of action.3 5
The litigation stemming from the Exxon Valdez oil spill is
perpetual and remains contentious; 36 and despite the fact that the spill
37
took place over twenty years ago, its ripples are still being felt today.
Following the spill, Exxon spent approximately $2.1 billion in cleanup
efforts, over $1 billion in criminal and civil penalties and damages to the
PM),
3,
2010,
6:02
MONEY
(June
Brokers,
CNN
http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/03/smallbusiness/bpwage-claims/index.htm.
30. See Robbie Brown, Fishermen May Be Cleaning the Spill That Put Them Out of Work,
2010,
1,
TIMES,
May
N.Y.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DEEDEI 13DF932A35756COA9669D8B63.
31. See Thomas Catan & Dionne Searcey, Dispute Rages on BP Liability for Wages, as
2010,
J.,
June
9,
WALL
ST.
Obama
Pushes,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748703627704575299153313210426.html.
32. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
33. Id. § 2702 (b)(2)(E) ("Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning
capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural
resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant").
34. See id § 2704(a).
35. See Deborah S. Bardwick, The American Tort System 's Response to Environmental
Disaster: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a Case Study, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 259, 275 (2000) ("[l]f
owners of a hotel found that tourists were canceling their reservations because an oiled Alaska was
less attractive than an unoiled Hawaii, they could not recover the indirect injury that the spill
caused").
36. See Jason Linkins, Exxon Valdez: How that Disaster Destroyed the Economy 20 Years
Later, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/08/Exxonvaldez-how-that-dis n 605080.html.
37. See id. ("The Exxon Valdez disaster, which occurred on March 24, 1989, played a major
role in the collapse of the economy some 19 years later").
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Federal and Alaskan state government, as well as "another $303 million
in voluntary settlements with fishermen, property owners, and other
private parties. ' ' 8 All parties still holding claims against Exxon,
including commercial fishermen seeking compensatory damages, were
consolidated into one large class by the District Court for the District of
Alaska.39
This class eventually received a final redress at the hands of the
Supreme Court some nineteen years after the disaster,40 despite the irony
that the significant delay in justice meant that many of the harmed
parties were not even around to see it.4 1 If they were around to see it,
they may have been terribly disappointed by the outcome, as the
Supreme Court cut the punitive damages Exxon was compelled to pay
(via the district court jury's original holding) from $5 billion to $507.5
million, matching the jury's compensatory award figure. 42
Many of the people harmed by the Valdez oil spill weren't even
included in the consolidated class because federal maritime tort law,
which was found to preempt Alaska tort law, only provides remedies for
43
those who suffer injuries resulting from direct contact with spilled oil.
There still exists some minimal concern that the OPA may also be
preempted by federal maritime law, in which case the CLEAR Act's
liability adjustment provision will not be applicable.4 4 In short, it
appears that the OPA liability provision is not preempted by maritime
law because the statute includes the following statement:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject to the
provisions of this chapter, each responsible party for a vessel or a
38.
39.

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008).
Id.

40.
41.

See id. at 2634.
See Robert Barnes, Justices Slash Damages for Exxon Oil Spill, WASH. POST, June 26,

2
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/25/AR200806 500663.html
("The legal battle has gone on for so long that attorneys for the plaintiffs estimate that at least 20
percent of them are now dead").
42. See Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 ("Today's ruling adds insult to injury to the fishermen,
communities and Alaska natives who have been waiting nearly 20 years for proper compensation
following the worst environmental disaster in our nation's history"). See also Barnes, supra note 41
(quoting a joint statement from Senators Ted Stevens and Lisa Murkowski, and Representative Don
Young).
43. Bardwick, supranote 35, at 273.
44. See Robert Force, Martin Davies, & Joshua S. Force, Deepwater Horizon: Removal

Costs, Civil Damages, Crimes, Civil Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL. L.

REV. 889, 970 (2011) ("The relationship between federal statute, general maritime law, and state
law has long raised complex questions of federalism and those questions do not simply go away
because of the nonpreemption provisions in OPA").
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facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial
threat of a discharge of oil, .... is liable for the removal costs45and
damages specified in subsection (b) that result from such incident.

In response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Congress passed the
OPA.46 Amongst other things, the Act created a cause of action for
people who suffered economic damages resulting from the discharge of
oil from a vessel or facility.47 One source of particular controversy in
the current debate about BP's liability is that the OPA limits the total
liability of a "responsible party" to $75 million per incident, excluding
all removal costs. 48 This figure was placed in the bill in the context of
the time the bill was passed; the Valdez spill had been "the worst marine
environmental disaster this Nation had ever experienced. During this
' 49
disaster 11 million gallons of oil spilled into the waters of ... Alaska.
By contrast, the Deepwater Horizon spill is estimated to have dumped
upwards of 185 million gallons.5
Given the enormous impact of the Deepwater Horizon spill, and the
eye-opening possibility of damage that is portended by a spill of that
magnitude, 51 $75 million is an embarrassingly small number,52 when
compared with potential costs of multiple billions of dollars.53

45. James Garner, The Oil Pollution Act of1990: Interplay with State and General Maritime
Law, HIGHTABLE (July 9, 2010), https://www.hightable.com/legal-issues/insight/the-oil-pollutionact-of-1990-interplay-with-state-and-general-maritime-law-49419.
46. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 134 (6th ed. 2009) ("Until 1990, liability for oil spills in U.S. waters was governed by a
confusing patchwork of five federal laws, three international conventions, three private international
agreements, and dozens of state laws").
47. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Liability Under the Oil Pollution Act: Current Law and
Needed Revisions, 71 LA. L. REV. 917, 926 (2011).
48. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) ("[T]he total of the liability of any responsible party under
section 2702 of this title and any removal costs incurred by, or on behalf of, the responsible party,
with respect to each incident shall exceed ... for an offshorefacility except a deepwater port, the
total of all removal costs plus $75,000,000") (emphasis added).
49. Presidential Statement on Signing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DoC. 1265 (Aug. 18, 1990).
50. See Timothy J. Crone and Maya Tolstoy, Magnitude of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Oil Leak,
330 SCIENCE 634 (2010), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/330/6004/634 (link to the
abstract; must be a subscriber to view full content).
51. See John Curran, The Gulf Oil Disaster: Who's Liable, andfor How Much?, TIME (May
24, 2010), available at http://www.time.comftimefbusiness/article/0,8559,1991408,00.html
(interviewing Professor Jody Freeman, Harvard Law School, former White House Counselor for
Energy and Climate Change).
52. See 156 CONG. REC. H6498 (daily ed. July 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Holt).
53. See Julia Kollewe, BP Oil Spill Cost Hits Nearly $10bn, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 20, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/sep/20/bp-oil-spill-deepwater-horizon-costs- 10bn. As
of September 20, 2010, costs had already reached $10 billion. Id.
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Naturally, legislators have been busily promoting various plans to
under the OPA since shortly after the Deepwater
increase liability
54
Horizon spill.
C. Acts Proposedto Raise the Damages Cap
One of the first pieces of legislation proposed in the wake of the
spill that addressed the OPA's damages cap was the Big Oil Bailout
Prevention Act of 2010, introduced by Representative Rush Holt (DNJ).55 Amongst other things, the bill sought to lift the OPA's damages
cap, both prospectively and retroactively in order to cover the Gulf oil
spill. 56 This proposition was later added to the CLEAR Act, a bill
introduced by Representative Nick Rahall (D-WV) long before the Gulf oil
spill occurred.5 7

When originally proposed, the CLEAR Act's main

purpose was to create a more efficient and transparent federal mining and
energy regulatory system by consolidating various programs into one entity
called the Office of Federal Energy and Minerals Leasing of the Department
of the Interior.5 8 However after the amendments to life liability caps, the
CLEAR Act became known as the Gulf Oil Spill Response Bill 9
The CLEAR Act has been stalled in Congress since August 4,
2010.60 The same is true of all the other bills intended to lift/raise the
OPA damages cap that stalled in Congress throughout 2010 and 2011.61
This is perhaps due in part to BP's "waiver" of the OPA's damages
62
cap, or it may be due to the pressure that certain parts of the oil
industry have placed upon legislators,63 or perhaps both factors play into

54. See Murchison, supra note 47, at 939-40.
55. See David Karas, Holt ReintroducesBig Oil Bailout Prevention Act, TIMES OF TRENTON
REGIONAL NEWS, Jan 28, 2011, http://www.nj.com/news/times/regional/index.ssf./base/news22/1296197167310560.xml&coll=5.
56. See id
57. See H.R. 3534, supranote 9.
58. Id.
59. See Ben Geman & Darren Goode, House Passes Oil Spill Response Bill But Senate Plans
for Legislation Uncertain, THE HILL, July 30, 2010, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2wire/ 11965-house-passes-oil-spill-response-bill-but-senate-plans-uncertain.
60. H.R. 3534, supra note 9. In the case of the CLEAR Act, the Act successfully passed
through the House, and stalled in the Senate. Id. As of August 4, 2010, the bill was placed on the
Senate Legislative Calendar, but has yet to be voted on. Id.
61. See Sam Stein, One Year After BP, Congress Has Yet to Change Oil Spill Liability Cap,
HUFFINGTON POST, June 18, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/18/one-year-after-bpcongres n_850677.html.
62. See supra Part I.
63. See Stein, supra note 61.
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the stagnancy of these pieces of litigation. 64 Yet, the retroactive liability
provisions of the CLEAR Act still provide an interesting legal pathway
for analyzing the Supreme Court's analysis of retroactive provisions
after EasternEnterprises.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL

GROUNDS FOR POTENTIAL OVERTURN OF

CLEAR

ACT

A. Takings, the Obvious Way or the Eastern Way?
Overwhelmingly, retroactive liability imposition has not been
overturned easily on constitutional grounds. 65 "The Due Process Clause
does not prohibit retrospective civil legislation, 'unless the consequences
are particularly harsh and oppressive."' 66 The Supreme Court carved out
an infamous exception to the typical constitutional upholding of
retroactive liability provisions in EasternEnterprises.67 But the story of
EasternEnterprises cannot be told in a void. The decisions in a few key
cases illustrate the chasm that had been building in anticipation of the
Supreme Court's decision in Eastern Enterprises,and68evidence the dire
need to fill that chasm, even after Eastern Enterprises.
1. Takings Jurisprudence Before EasternEnterprises
The judicial deference to Congress's right to retroactively amend its
own laws, elucidated in (and leading up to) Eastern Enterprises,though
the overwhelming standard, belies the ideals pronounced throughout our
jurisprudential history. Justice Story, "[i]n his Commentaries on the
Constitution.. .reasoned: 'Retrospective laws are, indeed, generally
unjust; and, as has been forcibly said, neither accord with sound
69
legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact."'
64. See id.
65. See generally E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, at 522-28 (discussing at length the string
of precedent behind denying constitutional challenges to retroactive liability statutes).
66. Fern v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 580, 589 (1988) (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134
(1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 534, 538.
68. See John Decker Bristow, Note, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel: Is the Court One Step
Closer to Unraveling the Takings and Due Process Clauses?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1525, 1555-56
(1999). "The Supreme Court's decision in Eastern Enterprises has thrown takings jurisprudence
into a further state of confusion and incoherence." Lisa R. Strauss, Note, The Takings Clause as a
Vehicle for Judicial Activism: Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel Presents a New Twist to Takings
Analyses, GA. ST. U. L. REv. 689, 738 (2000).
69. 524 U.S. at 533 (quoting 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1398 ( 5 h ed.
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Nonetheless, Justice Story concludes, "[s]till they are...left open to the
states, according to their own constitutions of government; and become
obligatory, if not prohibited by the latter., 70 The principles Justice Story
advocated for in 1833 remained fundamentally unchanged in the years
leading up to Eastern Enterprises,71 and even in the wake of the narrow
holding of Eastern Enterprises, there have remained few cases which
have overturned retroactive legislation on constitutional grounds.72
The takings clause as it was applied to Eastern Enterprises, and
indeed as it would potentially apply going forward to parties like BP,
stems from a line of analysis known as "regulatory takings" analysis.73
This entire line of reasoning stretches the takings clause, which states
simply within the broad Fifth Amendment, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation. , 74 As interpreted by the
courts, this clause has been held to prevent the government from taking
real property from an owner without compensating the owner
appropriately. 75 The "regulatory takings" line of cases stemmed from
Justice Holmes' reasoning that "[t]he general rule at least is that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking., 76 Until that decision in 1922, "virtually
no court found a taking when regulation restricted use but amounted
neither to outright expropriation nor to permanent physical

1891)).
70. 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1398 (5h ed. 1891).
71. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992); Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988); United States. v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173 (4th Cir.
1988) ("[E]ven if [this legislation] is understood to operate retroactively, it nonetheless satisfies the
dictates of due process because its liability scheme is rationally related to a valid legislative
purpose.").
72.
RAISED

See ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 7-5700, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
BY PENDING

BILLS TO INCREASE

RETROACTIVELY A LIABILITY LIMIT IN THE OIL

POLLUTION
ACT
5
(2010),
available
at
http://transportation.house.gov/Media/file/Full%20Committee/20100609/SSMFC.pdf
(discussing
the many Superfund cases evaluated by the court on constitutionality grounds and upheld in United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2003)). Further, given Eastern
Enterprises' four-justice plurality, courts have been hesitant to view EasternEnterprises' holding as
particularly precedential, except perhaps in very specific narrow circumstances. Franklin Cnty.
Convention Facilities Auth. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, 240 F.3d 534, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) ("We
conclude that Eastern Enterprises has no precedential effect on this case because no single rationale
was agreed upon by the Court").
73.

See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Argumentsfor the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine,

22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 90 (1995).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
75.

Byme, supra note 73, at 90.

76.

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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occupation., 77 Many scholars argue that the pre-1922 reasoning should
still be the standard, and as evidence they cite the "pernicious mess" that
has stemmed from the Supreme
Court's haphazard application of
78
analysis.
takings
regulatory
Prior to Eastern Enterprises,the Supreme Court had suggested that
the Takings Clause may be appropriately considered in cases involving
regulations to pay benefits, however it had denied the possibility that
applying "general financial liability, absent a connection to a specific
property interest, violates the Fifth Amendment". 79 The Supreme Court
eventually employed the analysis from its 1978 Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York 80 decision, in order to stretch
takings analysis to its logical extreme in Eastern Enterprises.
Penn Central involved a seemingly traditional takings claim, in that
the property right at issue was the property owner's right to build above
Grand Central Terminal in Manhattan. 8' The Supreme Court affirmed
the New York Court of Appeals' determination that the takings clause
had not been violated when New York City designated Grand Central
Terminal as a historic landmark, and precluded the appellants' from
building on the property. 82 While often it is facts (whether similarities or
differences) that give rise to application of law, in observing the Eastern
Enterprises plurality's use of Penn Central's reasoning, the facts of the
two cases are vastly different.8 3 The plurality's reasoning instead turned
purely on the "law" presented in Penn Central.
The Penn Centralcourt attempted to boil down some guidelines for
use in determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred, however, it
was a difficult undertaking because these types of cases often turn on the
specific facts of a particular case. 84 Nonetheless, the court laid out a set
77. Byrne, supra note 73, at 94.
78. See id. at 90. See also Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, The Supreme Court Solves the
Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 147 (1995) ("Many... have viewed the Supreme
Court's takings cases as incoherent, piecemeal, or categorical."); Richard J. Lazarus, Counting
Votes and Discounting Holdings in the Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1099, 1099 (1997) ("The regulatory takings issue is notoriously muddled").
79. Strauss, supranote 68, at 689.
80. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
81. Seeid. at 107.
82. See id. at 138.
83. Where Penn Central concerned some tangible physical property restriction by the
government, Eastern Enterprises only addressed a purely economic regulation. See infra Part
lI.A.2 (detailing the facts of Eastern Enterprises).
84. See438 U.S. at 124.
[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a
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of "particular[ly] significan[t]" factors to be used as guidance in these
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."8 5 The three factors the court
identified in Penn Central form the foundation upon which Eastern
Enterprises plurality takings analysis was built.8 6 The three factors to be

considered are "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations", as well as "the characterof the
governmental action. ' 7 In Penn Central,those factors were applied and
no uncompensated takings were found to have occurred, however the
factors have been used by many courts since in analyzing takings
cases,8 8 and proved successful for Eastern Enterprises.89
2. Eastern Enterprises Muddies the Water
The Congressional-deference set forth by Justice O'Connor,
speaking for a plurality of the Court in Eastern Enterprises, is that
"Congress... may impose retroactive liability to some degree,
particularly where it is 'confined to short and limited periods required by
the practicalities of producing national legislation.' 90 "However ...the
possibility [remains] that legislation might be unconstitutional if it
imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that
could not have anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is
substantially disproportionate to the parties' experience." 9 1 This
exception is still good law currently (though not without its detractors),92
and some circuits, in an effort to interpret the precedential value of
Eastern Enterprises's opinion, have even transformed this simple
sentence into an elemental takings test. 93 This despite the fact that even

few persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction
will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately
caused by it depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.'
Id.
85. Id.
86. See E. Enters. V. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 529 (1998).
87. 438 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added).
88. See e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-27 (1986);
Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602,
643-48 (1993).
89. See infra Part III.A.2.
90. 524 U.S. at 528 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 476 U.S. 717,
731 (1984)).
91. Id.at 528-29.
92. See, e.g., Bristow supra note 68, at 1526.
93. See Gibson v. Am. Cyanid Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1047-48 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
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the Eastern Enterprises
plurality was employing the factors borrowed
94
from Penn Central.

The facts of Eastern Enterprises are fairly complicated and can be
quite confusing. The challenge arose from an application of the Coal
Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act) to the petitioner,
Eastern Enterprises. 95 The Coal Act was Congress' "legislative remedy
for what it perceived to be a grave problem in the funding of retired coal
miners' health benefits ....

The Coal Act was passed in 1992 and

was to be applied by the Commissioner of Social Security
(Commissioner) to particular companies that had signed onto the 1978
coal wage agreement, which "assigned responsibility to signatory
employers for the health care of their own active and retired
employees, 97 or any subsequent coal wage agreement. 98 The Act also
was to apply to any other signatory coal operator, regardless of whether
they were privy to the 1978 agreement, which had employed a given
"retiree in the coal industry for a longer period of time than any other
signatory operator prior to the effective date of the 1978 coal wage
agreement." 99
This language is the portion of the Coal Act that was deemed by the
Commissioner to be applicable to Eastern Enterprises.100 By this time,
Eastern Enterprises had cut its ties to the coal industry; beginning in
1963, Eastern Enterprises had transferred "its coal-related operations to a
subsidiary, Eastern Associated Coal Corp. (EACC)"' 0 ' EACC was to
"assume all of Eastern's liabilities arising out of coal mining...
02
operations in exchange for Eastern's receipt of EACC's stock."'
Further, by 1987, Eastern Enterprises had fully sold all of its interest in
EACC to another company, Peabody Holding Company, Inc. 0 3 "Under
the terms of the [stock-sale] agreement ... Peabody, [subsidiary] CPC,
and EACC assumed responsibility for payments to certain benefit
plans," including the benefit plans that would have been applicable to
04
the retired coal workers.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See supra Part.IllA. 1.
524 U.S. at 504.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 514-15.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id. at 516.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In addition to this background, it must also be mentioned that
Eastern Enterprises had employed the thousand-plus retired coal miners,
for which they were now being asked to provide benefits, during the
years from 1929 to 1965.105 During that pertinent period, the benefits
provided to the miners were not so extensive as those from the later
1978 agreement and the subsequent passage of the Coal Act.10 6 The pre1965 industry employment contracts that Eastern Enterprises were a
signatory to provided only limited health care benefits to miners "to be
funded only out of coal sale royalties fixed at a predetermined rate" and
reflected no understanding that the coal companies intended
to be
07
benefits.1
health
post-retirement
their
for
miners
the
to
indebted
All this serves to explain why Eastern Enterprises felt unfairly
targeted for liability by the Commissioner under the Coal Act's
provisions. The cost to Eastern Enterprises was to be upwards of $5
million for one year of premiums. 108 Eastern Enterprises chose to seek
"a declaratory judgment that the Coal Act violates the Constitution and a
corresponding injunction against the Commissioner's enforcement of the
Act as to Eastern."'0 9 The company was unsuccessful in this suit at both
the District Court of Massachusetts, which granted summary judgment
on all counts against Eastern Enterprises, and at the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, which affirmed." 0 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed, narrowly holding that the Coal Act violated the
constitution, perhaps as a taking, or perhaps as a violation of due
process. 11
The opinions represented in the Eastern Enterprisesdecision reflect
105. See William L. Church, The Eastern Enterprises Case: New Vigorfor Judicial Review?,
2000 Wis. L. REV. 547, 548 (2000).
106. See id at 549-50.
107. Id. at 549.
108. 524U.S. at517.
109. Id. at 520. Eastern sought this remedy, despite the availability of a suit for
indemnification against Peabody, et al. Id. at 531-32. The Supreme Court addressed this matter
succinctly.
"[A]lthough the [Coal] Act preserves Eastern's right to pursue indemnification.. it does
not confer any right of reimbursement. Moreover, the possibility of indemnification
does not alter the fact that Eastern has been assessed over $5 million in... premiums and
that its liability under the... Act will continue for many years. To the extent that Eastern
may have entered into contractual arrangements to insure itself against liabilities arising
out of its former coal operations, that indemnity is neither enhanced nor supplanted by
the.. .Act and does not affect the availability of the declaratory relief Eastern seeks.".
Id.
10. Id.at 517. Additionally, "[o]ther Courts of Appeals have also upheld the Coal Act
against constitutional challenges." Id.at 519.
111. See id.
at 538, 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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deep disagreement and confusion on the bench, with four Justices
declaring the offending portion of the Coal Act violative of the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, while one Justice (Kennedy) concurred
in the judgment on strictly Fifth Amendment due process grounds and
vehemently opposed the plurality's reasoning. 1 2 The four-Justice
dissent (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens) "agreed with Justice
Kennedy that only due process review was appropriate. However, they
concluded that when subjected to review under this standard, the Coal
Act did pass muster .... ,,3 Justice Thomas, who signed onto the
plurality opinion, added in a brief, yet extremely outlying, concurrence
that he personally would consider overturning two hundred years of
jurisprudence in applying the Ex-Post Facto Clause of the4 first article of
the Constitution to cases outside of the criminal context."l
The plurality holding turned on application of the Penn Central
three factors, and the court viewed the "Coal Act's allocation scheme, as
applied to Eastern," as "unconstitutional [because] it imposes severe
retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have
anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is substantially
disproportionate to the parties' experience." ' "15 In applying the Penn
Central factors, the Court found first that the Coal Act "ha[d] forced a
considerable financial burden upon Eastern" and thus there had clearly
been an economic impact upon Eastern Enterprises." 16 Second, the Coal
Act was held to have
[S]ubstantially interfere[d] with Eastern's reasonable investmentbacked expectations. The Act's beneficiary allocation scheme reaches
back 30 to 50 years to impose liability against Eastern based on the
company's activities between 1946 and 1965. Thus, even though the
Act mandates only the payment of future health benefits, it nonetheless
"attaches new legal consequences to [an employment relationship]
'
completed before its enactment." 17
Applying the third Penn Centralfactor, the court held:
[T]he nature of the governmental action in this case is quite unusual.

112.

Church, supranote 105, at 551.

113.
dat552.
114. 524 U.S. at 538-39 ("Since Calderv. Bull... this Court has considered the Ex PostFacto
Clause to apply only in the criminal context. I have never been convinced of this limitation ....
115. Id.at 528-29 (plurality opinion)
116.
117.

Idat529.
Id.at 532 (quoting Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)).
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That Congress sought a legislative remedy for what it perceived to be a
grave problem in the funding of retired coal miners' health benefits is
understandable; complex problems of that sort typically call for a
legislative solution. When, however, that solution singles out certain
employers to bear a burden that is substantial in amount, based on the
employers' conduct far in the past, and unrelated to any commitment
that the employers made or to any injury they caused, the
governmental action implicates fundamental principles of fairness
underlying the Takings Clause. Eastern cannot be forced to bear the
expense of lifetime health benefits for miners based on its activities
decades before those benefits were promised. Accordingly, in the
specific circumstances of this case, we conclude that the
Coal Act's
118
application to Eastern effects an unconstitutional taking.
The plurality reasoned that application of the above factors added
up to an unconstitutional violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, despite their recognition that the Court's previous
opinions:
[M]ake clear that Congress has considerable leeway to fashion
economic legislation, including the power to affect contractual
commitments between private parties. Congress also may impose
retroactive liability to some degree, particularly where it is "confined
to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing
national legislation.
Still, the plurality found the Coal Act as applied to Eastern
Enterprises to fit within a narrow group of potential cases where
retroactive legislation "might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe
retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have
anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is substantially
20
disproportionate to the parties' experience."'
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, "represents a
divergence in regulatory takings jurisprudence because the analysis
121
removes the necessity that a specific property interest be at stake.'
The actual holding in Eastern Enterprises has retained precedential
value, though the reasoning employed by the plurality, that the Coal Act

118.

Id. at537.

119.

Id.
at 528.

120.
121.

Id. at 528-29.
Strauss, supranote 68, at 715-16.
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was a violation of the Takings Clause, does not necessarily so. 1 22 The
plurality opinion represented a particular brand of extension of takings
jurisprudence, one that had been brewing since the Supreme Court began
exercising123 reluctance to regulate economic interests on due process
grounds.

Prior to FDR's New Deal proposals, the Supreme Court routinely
utilized due process as a means of interpreting, and often overturning,
economic regulations.1 24 The Due Process Clause, which reads "[n]o
person shall be. . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law,' '125 is of course born out of the same amendment to the
Constitution that houses the takings clause. 126 The Fifth Amendment
ends with the Takings Clause, which reads "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.' 2 7 Given the close
proximity of the clauses, and the fact that both clauses pertain, at least in
part, to "property," it is no wonder that after the Court became explicitly
128
reluctant to overturn economic regulations on Due Process grounds,
that takings jurisprudence inherited this hefty responsibility. 29
Most of the Fifth Amendment rights, including due process, were
made applicable to the states in the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads
similarly, ". . .nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of lawFalse"' 130 The Takings Clause,
while not explicitly enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment, has been
held applicable to states as an inherent part of the due process provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 131 The Supreme Court's willingness to
read "takings" into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
which never explicitly mentions the takings language of the Fifth
122. Id. at 715.
123. See Bristow, supranote 68, at 1525-26.
124. See generally Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (the Supreme Court used the Due
Process Clause to interpret the right contract for employees and masters); Bristow, supra note 68, at
1525.
125. U.S. Const. amend. V.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The day is gone
when this Court uses the Due Process Clause.. to strike down... laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought.").
129. See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact
on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 607-08 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court's
willingness to "provide the same level of protection for property under the Takings Clause that the
Lochner Court afforded under the Due Process Clause").
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
131. See Chi., Burlington& Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226,241 (1897).
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Amendment, further illustrates the confusion the Court has
been unable
132
to solve over where due process ends and takings begins.
As a practical matter, it is not clear how the elements of an illegal
"taking" without compensation is even able to be met via a purely
economic regulation.'3 3 The Takings Clause requires that a property
right be taken by or for the government, without properly compensating
the party whose property was taken. 134 In the traditional sense, the
Takings Clause applies to situations that arise under eminent domain
takings of property for "public use."' 35 In recent years, eminent domain
takings have been allowed even more leeway, explicitly enfranchising
the government to take property from one private party and give it to
another private party, so long as the government and the receiving
private party
purport to be acting within the bounds of some "public
36
purpose."'

Notwithstanding the questionable extension of eminent domain
takings, at least the element of an identifiable property interest has been
met when in the context of taking physical property away from a
party. 137 Even extended to the more abstract portions of the traditional
property bundle of rights, the specific property interest test has
nonetheless been met. 138 Eastern Enterprises' plurality does not so
clearly map out any such specific property interest. 139 The conundrum
created by the plurality's opinion suggests that the just compensation
element must either be made moot or judicially written out of the takings

132. See generally Jonathan Sullivan, Note, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel: How Lochner Got it
Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103, 1128-29 (1999) ("Takings Clause Jurisprudence is Substantive Due
Process Jurisprudence [and] Substantive Due Process is the Source of the Modem Takings
Doctrine... the two are not just intertwined; they are nearly identical").
133. See generally id. at 1124-25 (the Takings Clause does not prohibit the government from
acting, just requires "just compensation." However, it is illogical for the government to compensate
an individual when the taking amounts to a seizure of cash).
134. U.S. Const. amend. V.
135. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. at 236.
136. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (Finding it
constitutional for the government to take property from private individuals and give it to a private
company for public benefit in the form of creation of new jobs).
137. See Sullivan, supra note 132, at 1119-20 (noting the problem of identifying a property
interest when the "[t]he very foundation of the regulatory takings doctrine is an expansion of the
concept of property." Being able to identify specific property interests is essential when fixing just
compensation).
138. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The property right at
stake in Penn Central was the somewhat abstract right to build upon one's property. See id. In that
case, a developer had intended to tear down and rebuild New York City's Grand Central Terminal,
in opposition to the city's efforts to landmark the building. See id.
139. Sullivan, supra note 132, at 1125.
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clause altogether. 40 Otherwise, the result that remains after Eastern
Enterprises is that the government may not take one's money (the only
"property right" at stake in Eastern Enterprises) without giving that
party money (the only plain meaning ever given to "just compensation").
The illogic of this approach is highlighted by even the case's
concurrence, where Justice Kennedy wrote with the type of vigor usually
retained for dissents,
Our cases do not support the plurality's conclusion that the Coal Act
takes property. The Coal Act imposes a staggering financial burden
on... Eastern Enterprises, but it regulates... without regard to
property. It does not operate upon or alter an identified property
interest, and it is not applicable to or measured by a property interest.
The Coal Act does not appropriate, transfer, or encumber an estate in
land (e.g., a lien on a particular piece of property), a valuable interest
in an intangible (e.g., intellectual property), or even a bank account or
accrued interest. The law simply imposes an obligation to perform an
act, the payment of benefits. The statute is indifferent as to how the
regulated entity elects to comply or the property it uses to do so. To the
extent it affects property interests, it does so in a manner similar to
many laws; but until today, none were thought to constitute takings. To
call this sort of governmental action a taking as a matter of
constitutional interpretation is both imprecise and, with all due respect,
unwise. 141
Justice Kennedy goes on to concur with the holding of the plurality,
however he urges that the Coal Act's unconstitutionality stems from
violation of the Due Process Clause, 142 perhaps reinstating the
determinative power of due process over economic regulations. 43 In
either case, for the plurality to have held that the Coal Act's retroactive
imposition of economic liability constituted a taking, this again dulled
44
the power of the Takings Clause as it is worded in the constitution.'
Since
the constitutional
clause
reads
"without just
compensation,"''4 the logical conclusion to a court's overturning of a
taking would be to remand the particular case for consideration of the
appropriate amount to compensate the victim of the taking. Given the
logical leap in the plurality's opinion, the holding in Eastern Enterprises
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See id.
E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998).
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part HI.D.
Id.
U.S CONST. amend. V.
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could not allow for any such logical result. Instead, what Eastern
Enterprises held was that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern Enterprises
was unconstitutional, 146 as opposed to a determination of the appropriate
level of just compensation. Obviously there was no opportunity for a
calculation of just compensation in a scenario in which one has no
specific property interest to measure and calculate. As stated earlier, the
calculation would have been something to the effect of: just
compensation (in cash), to replace the regulatory taking (of cash), 147 an
altogether confusing method for interpreting the framers intentions when
designing the takings clause.1 48 Justice Breyer, writing in dissent in
Eastern Enterprises, and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, expressed concern that just such a logical misstep may lead to
the type of scenario in which the Takings Clause applies "when the
government simply orders A to pay the government, i.e., when it
assesses a tax [.],,149
While Justice Breyer may have been unleashing his tax concern as
an illustration of the parade of horribles that the plurality's opinion may
unleash, apparently his concern was not so farfetched. In June 2009, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari to a case that came up from the
Supreme Court of Illinois, Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v.
Giannoulias.150 One of the main issues on appeal in that case was
whether a tax could be held as violative of the takings clause of the
constitution.15' The Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that a tax was
not a subject of the Takings Clause, though amongst the multiple
petitions for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was one particular
petition, written by law professors eager to see the Supreme Court clear
the haze surrounding the takings clause jurisprudence since Eastern
52
Enterprises.1
In Empress Casino, the court relied upon the concurring and
dissenting opinions of Eastern Enterprises to support the holding that
146. 524 U.S. at 538 ("[W]e conclude that the Coal Act's allocation of liability to Eastern
violates the Takings Clause, and that [the Coal Act] should be enjoined as applied to Eastern.").
147. See id at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
148. Id.
149. Id. at 556.
150. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias, 129 S. Ct. 2764 (2009).
151. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Empress Casino Joliet Corp., 129 S.Ct 2764 (2009)
(No. 08-945), 2009 WL 208133 at *i.
152. See Brief for Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, Empress Casino
Joliet Corp.,, 129 S.Ct. 2764 (2009) (No.08-945), 2009 WL 527000 at *8-9 ("As the petition
demonstrates, there is deep disarray among both federal and state courts as to the applicability of the
Takings Clause to laws that impose monetary exactions... Matters of this import cannot be left to
the doctrinal incoherence of the fractured decision in EasternEnterprises.").
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"the Takings Clause has never been held to apply to an exaction of
money unrelated to an identifiable real, personal, or intellectual property
interest. In other words, a tax cannot be a taking." 15 3 Instead, the court
reasoned that the true holding of Eastern Enterprises would either be
based upon due process grounds or, apparently, nothing at all. 5 4 Thus,
there is at least some current precedent that judicially prefers the due
process, rather
than the Takings, understanding of the holding in Eastern
55
Enterprises.'
Many other courts have expressed doubt about the viability of the
Eastern Enterpriseplurality opinion.15 6 The Eleventh Circuit, in a 2008
decision, characterized the EasternEnterprisesdecision as "fragmented"
and determined that in such a case, the Court had a right to view the
holding as the narrowest ground upon which the concurring opinions
agree. 57 Thus, that court decided, there was no proper holding for them
to follow, save for that the Coal Act as applied to Eastern Enterprises
was unconstitutional in some fashion. 58 The court then proceeded to
ignore EasternEnterprises' takings analysis, and instead5 utilize
some of
9
guidance.1
as
concurrence
process
due
Justice Kennedy's
Another example of a court declining to extend EasternEnterprises
60
can be found in a 2004 decision by the Eastern District of Illinois.
That opinion held that, due to EasternEnterprises' four Justice plurality
opinion, "Eastern Enterprises cannot be said to have changed the
Court's Takings Clause precedent and [a party's]
citation to the case can
' 6
have nothing more than persuasive appeal."' 1
The courts were not the only forums in which the Eastern
Enterprises opinion was questioned. In fact, in the years following
Eastern Enterprises, many members of the legal and academic
62
community came out in strong opposition to the plurality's opinion.

153. Chaim Gordon, Note, Protecting Peter When the Legislature Robs Peter to Pay Paul
After Empress Casinov. Giannoulias,63 TAX LAW. 1299, 1304 (2010).
154. See id.
155. See infra Part III.B.
156. See id; Swisher Int'l,
Inc. v.Schafer,550 F.3d 1046, 1053 (1lth Cir. 2008).
157. Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at1053.
158. Seeid.at1054.
159. Id. at1057.
160. See Winger v.Banhart, 320 F.Supp.2d 741, 745 (C.D.Ill.
2004).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 68, at 738; Church, supranote 105, at548; Sullivan, supra
note 132, at1128; Bristow, supranote 68, at1555-56.
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3. Applying Eastern Enterprises to the CLEAR Act's Retroactive
Lifting of the OPA Damages Cap
While the factual scenario presented by a potential challenge to the
constitutionality of a retroactive repeal of the OPA's damages cap does
not match up to the facts in Eastern Enterprises, the argument would be
that the CLEAR Act's retroactive nature constitutes an illegal taking.
Despite the factual divergence between the Coal Act as applied in
Eastern Enterprises and the CLEAR Act as potentially applied to BP,
the retroactive similarity, combined with the Supreme Court's protection
of corporate interests, 163 may provide a fertile ground for judicial
activism in disallowing the repeal of the OPA's damages cap.
Some scholars have posited that BP has three potential takings
arguments. First, BP could argue that it possessed "a claimed right to
164
having the relevant law (the current liability cap) remain unchanged."'
This argument is unlikely to prevail because the Supreme Court in New
York Central Railroad Co. has held: "No person has a vested interest in
any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for
165
his benefit."'
Second, BP could argue that the CLEAR Act "effect[s] a taking of
166
its disbursements to cover damages beyond the existing liability cap.'
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court established a three-prong test to
address this issue. 167 Under this test, the factors to consider are as
follows: (1) the economic impact of government action, (2) the degree to
which it interferes with reasonable, distinct investment-backed
68
expectations, and (3) the character of the government action.1
BP could argue on the first Penn Central factor, that the CLEAR
Act poses a grave economic impact upon them. The total monetary cost
of damages for BP could be astronomical, given the impact of the
Deepwater Horizon spill. 169 This factor alone is not decisive, however.
BP will be required to demonstrate that the economic impact of the
CLEAR Act is "very substantial, if not severe."' 170 In Concrete Pipe, the
Supreme Court held that a retroactively imposed monetary liability did

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See infra Part IV.A.
Meltz, supra note 72, at 3.
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917).
Meltz, supra 72, at 3.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Id.
See Meltz, supra note 72, at 4-5.
Id. at 4.
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not effect a taking even where it amounted to 46% of shareholder
equity. 171 Based on this case, some predict that the potential additional
liability under the CLEAR
Act will not fulfill the Penn Central "very
72
substantial" standard.1
Second, BP could argue that the CLEAR Act's removal of the
OPA's damages cap significantly interferes with their reasonable
investment-backed expectations, in that prior to the CLEAR Act, the
company was doing business under the impression that its liability for
economic damages would be capped at $75 million. BP may argue that,
just like any other reasonable corporate actor, prior to embarking on
their drilling operations, they perform a cost-benefit analysis, and their
potential liability under existing law is factored into that analysis. This
argument may come across as disingenuous, however a sympathetic
court may give it some weight.
In applying the second Penn Central factor, it seems unlikely that
BP will be successful in arguing that removing the OPA liability cap
interfered with its reasonable expectations. 173 Since the 1950s, oil174
drilling operations in the Gulf have been thoroughly regulated.
Further, after BP entered into the lease at issue in 2008, federal oil spill
liability limits have increased significantly. 175 Moreover, when the
Supreme Court addressed the second factor of the Penn Central test in a
case involving retroactive monetary liability, it stated: "Those who do
business in [a] regulated field cannot object if the regulatory scheme is
buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end." 176
BP's argument may be bolstered by referencing insurance in their
cost-benefit analysis calculation, and the fact that it may present an
undue burden upon a party to insure themselves at a level above that of
the current liability scheme for their industry. However, as the oil
industry is such a risky business,
BP is self-insured, which is another way of saying it isn't insured at all
except when it is required to be by law. Why? Because it doesn't
make economic sense for BP to pay the kind of premiums it would be

171.
(1993).
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645
Meltz, supra note 72, at 4.
Seeid at4.
Id.
Id
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:2

charged to cover itself in what is fundamentally a risky business. 177
BP is insured through "a wholly owned subsidiary, Jupiter
Insurance, for the insurance it has to take out" at law. 178 Thus, "[s]elfinsurance in this case means that BP will wear the bill whichever way
you cut it - even if Jupiter had had much higher payout limits, BP
would have ended up having to recapitalize the insurer."'' 79 Given this
insurance scheme, BP would have a much harder time arguing that
insurance was unavailable at levels above those of the OPA's damages
cap, as the company had apparently not procured their insurance on the
open market, and perhaps there was no actual market for them to procure
insurance from.
The third Penn Central factor as applied to BP could turn on the
congressional intent of the CLEAR Act. Were it abundantly clear that
the bill was passed solely to punish BP for actions that already took
place, BP could argue that the nature of the governmental action
constitutes a "taking" akin to the taking found by the plurality in Eastern
Enterprises. 80 If Eastern Enterprises was able to get around the Coal
Act's enforcement upon them to pay benefits for their former
employees, then BP may have some legs for an argument that Congress
is unconstitutionally taking from them as a punishment for what they
deemed to be an accident in the past. Given some of the language
focusing specifically on BP by Congress in support of the CLEAR Act
(and the Big Oil Bailout Prevention Act even more explicitly), 18' BP
may argue that the lifting of the damages cap was not done to protect
economic interests going forward, but instead to retroactively punish
them.
BP may also attempt to make the argument that the CLEAR Act
affects a taking because BP had a "contract right under [its] lease to
exclude application to the lease of laws enacted after it was entered
into."' 18
The lease that BP entered into with the United States
government contained the following language: "The lease is issued
subject to [the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, existing regulations
thereunder, and certain future regulations thereunder] and all other
177. Joe Ortiz, BP Oil Spill Sparks Debate on Captive Insurers, WALL ST. J. BLOG (June 9,
2010, 9:41AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2010/06/09/bp-oil-spill-sparks-debate-on-captiveinsurers/.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998).
181. See supra Part I.A.
182. Meltz, supranote 72, at 6.
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applicable statutes and regulations."' 8 3 BP could argue that "all other
applicable statutes" does not refer to future statutes. 8 4 This argument is
bolstered by the Supreme Court's decision in Mobil Oil Exploration &
ProducingSoutheast, Inc. v. United States, where the Court held that an
Outer Continental Shelf lease, with similar language, was governed only
by statutes that existed at the time of the contract.185 Unfortunately for
BP, federal courts have long addressed problems involving contracts as
breach of contract cases, not takings cases. 186
B. Due Process:Eastern'sActual Holding?
Although the Eastern Enterprises majority held that the Coal Act
was unconstitutional, there was disagreement over which clause
supported the holding. 87 While Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia,
Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist all found that the Act
violated the Takings Clause, Justice Kennedy held that it violated
substantive due process instead. 88 Complicating matters is Justice
Breyer's dissent agreeing with Justice Kennedy that statutes imposing
retroactive monetary liability should be analyzed through the due
process clause, not the takings clause. 189 Without a clear guiding
principle,
courts have had
considerable
trouble
applying
9 0Despite the plurality's opinion, some courts have
Eastern.m
viewed
Justice Kennedy's concurrence and the dissent's analysis as the true
holding. 191 For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has noted that "[t]o the extent that Eastern embodies
principles capable of broader application, we
believe that due process
192
analysis encompasses the relevant concerns."'

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 616 (2000).
186. See Hughes Commc'ns Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir.
2001). The Contract Clause only applies to the states, not to the federal government. See infra Part
WV.
187. See generally E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
188. Id. at 550 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
189. Id. at 554 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
190. See Steven J. Eagle, Protecting Propertyfrom Unjust Deprivations beyond Takings:
Substantive Due
Process,Equal Protection, and State Legislation, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKING ISSUES: PUBLIC AND

PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 511, 518-19 (Thomas E. Roberts ed. 2002).
191. Id. at 517-18.
192. Id. at 519.
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Scholars are equally perplexed. 193 To some, the 5-4 holding that
the Coal Act implicated the Due Process Clause and not the Takings
Clause, signified the revival of substantive due process analysis in the
economic context.194 To others, Kennedy and the dissent's reliance on
substantive due process is limited to the specific facts in Eastern
Enterprises, and should not be interpreted as "giv[ing] a boost" to
substantive due process. 195 Alternatively, some critics have asserted that
Eastern Enterprises ultimately stands for the notion that "the Court
should stop enforcing unenumerated rights altogether, for it either cannot
or will not find a means to 'discover' them that can be constrained by the
' 196

Constitution as written."

1. Brief History of Substantive Due Process
The idea that a citizen is entitled to due process of law comes from
the Fifth Amendment 9 7 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 98 The Due
Process Clauses not only protect procedural rights, they also have been
read to provide substantive rights (substantive due process).1 99 As such,
the Supreme Court has used substantive due process to create rights that
are not expressly provided in the Constitution. °0 Such rights have
included "the right to own slaves, the right to abortion, and the right to
live with one's extended family.",20 1 In addressing whether a law
withstands a constitutional challenge, substantive due process demands
that laws are "rationally related to a government purpose. ,,202
Starting in the late nineteenth century and continuing into the early
twentieth century, the Supreme Court invoked substantive due process to
193. Compare Robert Ashbrook, Land Development, The Graham Doctrine and the Extinction
of Economic Substantive Due Process, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1255, 1294-95 (2002) ("Although
seeming to give a boost to substantive due process, this type of plurality decision is perhaps best
viewed as narrowly applicable only to its particular facts"), with Eagle, supranote 190, at 519 ("In a
broader sense, however, Eastern Enterprises might serve as a catalyst for a reappraisal of
substantive due process").
194. Eagle, supranote 190, at 519.
195. Ashbrook, supranote 193, at 1294-95.
196. Sullivan, supra note 132, at 1136.
197. U.S. Const. amend. V ("[n]o person shall be ...deprived of... property, without due

process of law").
198. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
199. Philip Jordon, Substantive Due Process Since Eastern Enterprises, With New Defenses
Basedon Lack of Causative Nexus. The Superfund Example, 32 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L.REV. 395, 405
(2005).
200. Sullivan, supranote 132, at 1108.
201.

Id.

202.

Jordon, supranote 199, at 405.
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invalidate a number of state statutes regulating economic matters.2 °3
Perhaps the most noteworthy case in this area was Lochner v. New
York. 2° In that case, a bakery owner was charged with violating a New
York State law restricting the amount of hours that an employer could
require his employees to work. 20 5 The Court struck down the law on
substantive due process grounds, holding that "there was no 'reasonable
ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free
contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a
baker.' ' 20 6 From the late nineteenth century until the 1930s, a period
referred to as the Lochner era, the Supreme Court regularly rejected
economic legislation for violating substantive due process.20 7
In 1937, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, brought an end to the
Lochner era.20 8 Since that case, economic regulation has rarely been
invalidated on substantive due process grounds.20 9 Instead, substantive
due process has been used primarily to "protect unenumerated rights of
participation in the political process, particularly those of
210 'discrete,
insular minorities' and those that were 'fundamental rights.'
2. Due Process Challenges to Retroactive Economic Liability Prior to
EasternEnterprises
Prior to Eastern Enterprises, attacks against retroactive economic
laws were rarely successful.2 1 1 For example, more than two decades
before Eastern Enterprises, the Supreme Court in Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining dealt with a similar fact pattern, but refused to strike
down the statute at issue on substantive due process grounds.2 12 Usery
involved a challenge to Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969 as amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972,
which among other things required coal-mining operators to compensate
former employees who contracted pneumoconiosis.2 3 The parties
challenging the law argued that it violated due process because it

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See id. at 406.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 407.
Id. at 406,408.
Id. at 408.
Sullivan, supra note 132, at 1110.
Id.
atlllO-11.
See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 3 (1976).
See id.
at 38.
See id. at 1.
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mandated that operators pay miners who came down with the illness,
even if they were no longer employed by that operator when the law was
passed.21 4 Addressing whether the statute violated substantive due
process merely because it was retroactive, the Court noted the following:
To be sure, insofar as the Act requires compensation for disabilities
bred during employment terminated before the date of enactment, the
Act has some retrospective effect although, as we have noted, the Act
imposed no liability on operators until 1974. And it may be that the
liability imposed by the Act for disabilities suffered by former
employees was not anticipated at the time of actual employment. But
our cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not
unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. This
of the legislation is to impose a new duty
is true even though the effect 215
or liability based on past acts.
Having settled that a law's retroactive application does not alone
make it unconstitutional, the Court noted that there are circumstances
216
However, the Court ruled
when retroactivity may violate due process.
that Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 did
not present one of those circumstances.217 In the words of Justice
Marshall, "[here] [w]e find.., that the imposition of liability for the
effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified as a rational measure to
spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited
from the fruits of their labor the operators and the coal consumers. 21 8
The coal-mining operators also contended that the Act violated
substantive due process because it spread costs in an arbitrary and
Specifically, they argued that it was
irrational manner.21 9
unconstitutional because it attached liability based "upon past
employment relationships, rather than taxing all coal mine operators
presently in business. 2 20 Unfortunately for the Operators, the Court
214. Id.at 12.
215. Id.at 15-16.
216. See id.at 17 ("Thus, in this case the justification for the retrospective imposition of
liability must take into account the possibilities that the Operators may not have known of the
danger of their employees' contracting pneumoconiosis, and that even if they did know of the
danger their conduct may have been taken in reliance upon the current state of the law, which
imposed no liability on them for disabling pneumoconiosis").
217. See id.
218. Id. at 18.
219. Id.
220. Id.("The Operators note that a coal mine operator whose work force has declined may be
faced with a total liability that is disproportionate to the number of miners currently employed. And
they argue that the liability scheme gives an unfair competitive advantage to new entrants into the
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found that the law was, at the very least, rationally related to Congress's
intentions to compensate coal miners who became stricken with
pneumoconiosis. 221 As such, it refused to question the wisdom of the
Congress' "chosen scheme." 222
Until EasternEnterprises, Usery was the rule, not the exception. 3
Even after Eastern Enterprises, many would argue that Usery is still
controlling law, and that Eastern Enterprises was just an aberration
confined to its own fact pattern.224 The federal courts' response to due
process challenges to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Cleanup, and Liability Act (CERCLA) provides support for this
proposition. CERCLA was a federal law, which amongst other things
imposed retroactive liability on polluters. 225 Fortunately for proponents
of the CLEAR Act, the courts have all upheld the retroactive provisions
of CERCLA.226 One notable case dealing with this subject matter is
United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal,Inc. 227 In said
case, the court held that although CERCLA punished polluters for
actions taken before the law was passed, it was a remedial "statute that
attache[d] liability to present conditions stemming from past acts [and]
d[id] not necessarily have retroactive effects that are subject to
[substantive] due process limitations. 228
Another relevant case is United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical& Chemical Co. 229 In that case, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that a defendant who had disposed of
numerous fifty-five gallon drums of toxic waste on a farm was liable for
cleanup costs even though it committed this offense before the passage
of CERCLA.23 ° Like in Usery, the party opposing the law at issue
argued that it was unconstitutional because it created a "new form of
liability" that "upsets otherwise settled expectations. '
The Eighth
232
The
Circuit, adopting the reasoning of Usery, rejected this contention.
industry, who are not saddled with the burden of compensation for inactive miners' disabilities").
221. See id.
222. Id. at 18-19.
223. See Jordon, supranote 199, at 405.
224. See generally Ashbrook, supra note 193, at 1294-95.
225. Jordon, supra note 199, at 398.
226. Id.
227. 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986).
228. Id. at 996.
229. 810 F.2d 726 (8f Cir. 1986).
230. Id. at 749.
231. Id. at 733.
232. Id. ("[L]egislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets
otherwise settled expectations. This is true even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a
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court then applied the traditional due process test, stating that "[d]ue
process is satisfied 'simply by showing that the retroactive application of
' ' 23 3
the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose.
Consequently, it found that CERCLA met this standard.234 The court
reasoned that "substantive due process is not violated in cases when an
enterprise is assigned liability because it caused or benefited from an
235
activity.,
IV. EASTERN - A TRANSFORMATION OR RESTATEMENT OF DUE PROCESS
PRINCIPLES?

EasternEnterpriseswas pivotal because it was one of the rare cases
where a retroactive monetary provision was deemed unconstitutional,
but it is uncertain whether the case transformed substantive due process
jurisprudence or merely restated its core principles. While the Supreme
Court has yet to clarify Eastern Enterprises and the lower courts have
had considerable trouble interpreting the case, the latter interpretation is
more persuasive. The justices composing the Eastern Enterprises
majority did not overturn the Act merely because it was retroactive; they
did so because its application was arbitrary and unfair. 236 This has long
been the test for substantive due process.2 37
A. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
As mentioned supra, Eastern involved a challenge to a provision of
the Coal Act that forced Eastern to pay into an employee health and
retirement benefit fund even though it left the coal industry decades
before the passage of said act and never agreed to provide such
benefits.238 Unlike the rest of the majority, Justice Kennedy did not
believe that the Coal Act affected a taking because in his view, it did not
target a "property interest,, 239 but instead required Eastern Enterprises to

new duty or liability based on past acts").
233. Id.
234. Id. at 733-34 ("Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a
legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such
legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches ....).
235. Jordon, supranote 199, at 400.
236. See E. Enters. V. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998).
237. See Jordon, supra note 199, at 416.
238. Seeid. at411.
239. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540. According to Justice Kennedy, a person or corporation may
hold a property interest in an estate in land, intellectual property, and a bank account. Id.
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"perform an act, the payment of benefits., 240 Further, Justice Kennedy
felt that the Due Process Clause would provide a more appropriate
remedy than the takings clause. 241
Relying on Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., Kennedy held that
the test for determining if a retroactive law violates the Due Process
Clause is whether "the legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way., 242 As such, a law may be rejected on "due process grounds only
under the most egregious of circumstances. 2 43 Furthermore, under the
traditional analysis, a retroactive law does not offend the Due Process
Clause if it is "clearly just and reasonable, and conducive to the general
Applying this analysis to the facts in Eastern Enterprises,
welfare.'
Justice Kennedy held that the Coal Act was unconstitutional because it
was not reasonably related to the government's interest in support of the
statute.245 Kennedy noted that in the past, the Court has upheld laws
imposing retroactive monetary liability on employers when such laws
were remedial,246 but this was not one of those statutes.247 Kennedy's
opinion was grounded on the idea that it was arbitrary and irrational to
impose liability on a company that had not caused the injury nor had any
expectation that it would have to pay pension benefits.24 8
B. Dissent
The dissent agreed with Justice Kennedy's decision to analyze the
facts in Eastern Enterprises under the Due Process Clause. 249 Like
Kennedy, Justice Breyer stated that the takings clause did not apply to
this case because the clause is concerned with "providing compensation
for legitimate government action that takes 'private property' to serve
the 'public' good," not with "preventing arbitrary or unfair government
action. 2 50 Moreover, like Kennedy, Breyer asserted that the majority
240. See id.
a case such as this one, it cannot be said that monetary relief against the
241. Id. at 547. "[1]n
Government is an available remedy." Id.at 521 (majority opinion).
242. Id.at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
243. Id. at 550.
244. Id. at 549 (citing 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, at *455-56).
245. Id.
246. Id.Statutes which "impose an 'actual measurable cost of the [the employer's] business'
which the employer had been able to avoid in the past" may be constitutional. Id.
247. Id.at 549-50.
248. See Jordon, supranote 199, at 414 (citing 524 U.S. at 549-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part)).
249. Id. (citing 524 U.S. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
250. 524 U.S. at 554.
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should not have used the takings clause because the Coal Act did not
implicate property; it merely imposed "ordinary liability to pay money,
and not to the Government, but to third parties.', 251 Notably, Breyer
articulated that if the Coal Act targeted a specific fund of money, it
might have violated the takings clause.2 52 But since the Coal Act
imposed only a general liability, such an analysis would be
inappropriate.25 3 In Breyer's view, the Due Process Clause provided a
much more appropriate avenue for determining the constitutionality of
the Coal Act.254 In addressing substantive due process, Breyer addressed
the fear that relying upon255the Due Process Clause could revive Lochner,
but quickly dismissed it.

Breyer's substantive due process analysis can be broken down into
one question: "[would it be] fundamentally unfair to require Eastern to
make future payments for health care costs of retired miners and their
25 6
families, on the basis of Eastern's past association with these miners?,
Finding that a sufficient relationship existed between Eastern and the
257
miners, Justice Breyer answered in the negative.
C. Substantive Due Process Going Forward
While Kennedy's ultimate decision may have diverged from past
challenges to retroactive economic legislation, his reasoning did not.
Some may interpret Kennedy's statement that severely retroactive
legislation violates due process because such laws "change the legal
consequences of transactions long closed... [and] destroy the
reasonable certainty and security which are the very objects of property
that the Court was becoming less comfortable
ownership, ,,258 as proof ta
affirming laws that upset settled expectations. This statement, however,
25 9
is in accordance with the traditional substantive due process analysis.
Upsetting settled expectations has always been a factor in the due
260
process
test, just not
a determinative
Ultimately,
Kennedy,
as well asone.
the other justices, focused on the

251.

Id.

252.

Id. at 555.

253.

Id.

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
Id.
at 558-59.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
See id.
at 549-50.
See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss2/9

32

Claveloux: Eastern Enterprises as the Canary in the Coalmine: Will the Supre

2012]

EASTERN ENTERPRISES AS THE CANARYIN THE COALMINE

641

same question they asked in Usery: did Eastern "cause the harm, and if
not, did it enjoy a sufficiently direct benefit from the harm?

'26 1

Stated

otherwise, if a "reasonable nexus" existed between Eastern and the
alleged harm, imposing new liability on the company would not be
arbitrary or irrational. In Usery, the Court found that such a nexus
existed because the coal mine operators challenging Title IV of the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 directly benefitted
from the work that led many miners to become ill with
pneumoconiosis.26 2 Similarly, in the CERCLA cases, courts found that
requiring polluters to pay cleanup costs for actions taken before
CERCLA was passed was appropriate because they caused the pollution
and directly benefitted from it. 263 In Eastern Enterprises however, the
Court found that the "causative nexus" was far too attenuated.2 64 That is
because Eastern, unlike the operators in Usery, left the coal industry
long before the passage of the Coal Act. 65
Since Eastern Enterprises, the only retroactive liability laws to be
struck down on due process grounds are ones where the "causative
nexus" between the party facing liability and the harm to be remedied is
attenuated, if not non-existent altogether.26 6 For example, in Gibson v.
American Cyanamid Co., the Eastern District of Wisconsin struck down
as unconstitutional a Wisconsin common law rule that allowed plaintiffs
who couldn't determine which company sold the specific paint that
caused their lead ingestion injuries to sue any company that sold paint in
that state.267 In that case, the plaintiff used this rule to sue a company
that did not sell paint itself, but rather was the predecessor in interest of
another company that at one time sold paint in Wisconsin.26 8 Like other
courts before it, the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that "it violates
due process when there is no nexus or provable connection between a
damages award and the harmful conduct of the defendant. 269

261.
262.
263.
264.
judgment
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Jordon, supra note 199, at 416.
428 U.S. at 39.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
Jordon, supra note 199, at 414 (citing 524 U.S. at 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
and dissenting in part)).
Id. at 410.
See, e.g., Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 719 F. Supp.2d 1031, 1052 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 1048-49.
Id. at 1052.
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D. Application ofsubstantive due process analysis to the CLEAR Act
Even after Eastern Enterprises, the standard for establishing a
violation of substantive due process rights in the context of retroactive
economic legislation is highly unfavorable to BP's cause. In order to
demonstrate such a violation, it would have to establish that the
legislation at issue has no "rational legislative purpose. 2 70 Considering
that BP was directly responsible for the Gulf oil spill, it would be
extraordinarily difficult for the company to successfully make this
argument. Conversely, it would be quite easy for the government to
construct a compelling argument that section 702 does in fact serve a
rational purpose. One such purpose could be to increase the likelihood
that BP, the party responsible for the spill, provides appropriate redress
to those harmed by it.
Eastern Enterprises is unlikely to save BP. Unlike in that case,
where there was a weak causative nexus,27' the connection between BP
and the oil spill is strong. Not only did BP own the Macondo well, but it
also benefitted enormously from offshore oil drilling and continues to do
SO.

2 72

BP may argue that section 702 of the CLEAR Act violates due
process because it upsets its settled expectation that it would only be
liable for $75 million in economic damages per spill. However, courts
have consistently held that this is not enough to create a due process
violation.2 73 Even absent this precedent, BP's argument here would be
unlikely to succeed because it was foreseeable that in the event of a
highly destructive spill, BP would be required to pay more than $75
million in economic damages. This is because the OPA does not shield
BP for acts of gross negligence,274 nor does the damages cap apply to
state tort laws.275
Even in the unlikely case that courts reverse their long held stance
270. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984).
271. Jordon, supra note 199, at 414 (citing E. Enters. V. Apfel 524 U.S. 498, 550 (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
272.

Offshore

Field

Development

Projects:

Macondo,

SUBSEAIQ,

http://www.subseaiq.com/data/Project.aspx?project-id=562&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport-1
(last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
273.
See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976).

274.

33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(A) (2006).

275. See Quinn Bowman, Oil Spill Liability a Complicated Legal Web, PBS ONLINE
NEwsHOuR, June 7, 2010, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/politics/jan-junelO/oillaw 0604.html.; see also Peter J. Henning, Looking for Liability in BP' Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, June 7, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/looking-for-liability-in-bps-

gulf-oil-spill/.
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that retroactive liability is not automatically unconstitutional, an
argument could be made that section 702 is not retroactive because it is
addressing a harm that is ongoing. As noted supra, this argument was
adopted by the South Carolina Recycling & Disposal court.276
Specifically, that court noted that CERCLA was a remedial statute, not a
retroactive statute, because it "attache[d] liability to present conditions
stemming from past acts. 2 7 7 Considering that those residents and
businesses in the Gulf region will likely be dealing with the BP spill for
years, if not decades, to come, such logic also applies to the instant case.
V. ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR OVERTURNING
RETROACTIVE LIABILITY

In addition to takings and due process arguments, it is worth briefly
considering arguments premised on the Ex-Post Facto Clause,
Impairment of Contracts Clause, and the Bill of Attainder Clause. While
applying article I, section 9: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed" language to retroactive civil legislation may seem the
logical constitutional argument, it would be futile for BP to argue that
eliminating the OPA damages is unconstitutional under the ex-post facto
clause because such clause was determined long ago to be applicable
only to criminal cases, not to civil liabilities.278 Similarly, it would be
futile for BP to argue that section 702 of the CLEAR ACT violates the
Impairment of Contracts Clause, 279 because the Supreme Court
established that the clause, by its plain meaning, only applies to laws
passed by the states, not the federal government.280
BP's potential Bill of Attainder argument, although highly unlikely
to succeed, may have some traction. The Bill of Attainder Clause
prohibits Congress from enacting legislation that effectively "[declares]
guilt, and [imposes] punishment upon, an identifiable individual [or
281
entity], without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.
According to the Supreme Court, in order for legislation to trigger the
Bill of Attainder Clause, it must: "(1) single out a specific person or

276. See supra Part III.B.;
United States v. S.C. Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
996 (D. S.C. 1986).
277. 653 F. Supp. at 996.
278. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798).
279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("[n]o State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts").
280. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984).
281. Nixon v. Adm'r ofGen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,468 (1977).
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class and (2) be punitive. 28 2 To determine whether a particular law is
punitive, the Court considers whether the punishment the law imposes
has traditionally been prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause, and
whether such law furthers a non-punitive objective.2 83 Additionally, the
Court may look at whether there are "less burdensome alternatives" to
achieve that objective.284 In making the determination whether a law
violates the Bill of Attainder Clause, the court weighs all
aforementioned factors together.2 85
Thus no single factor is
286
determinative.
BP may argue that by making section 702 retroactive, Congress is
specifically punishing the oil company for the Gulf oil spill. In support
of this assertion, BP may point to comments made by Representative
287
Holt of New Jersey during a debate in Congress over the CLEAR Act.
In particular, BP may cite Holt's comment that "[u]nder the current law,
BP is responsible for.. .only.. .$75 millionFalseFor a spill of this
magnitude, a limit as low as $75 million is laughable., 288 Furthermore,
BP may bring up Holt's statement that, "[a]fter the spill began, I led 85
of my colleagues in introducing the Big Oil Bailout Prevention Act,
which would raise the liability cap now and retroactively.., the CLEAR
Act will ensure that BP is legally liable for all economic and natural
resource damages it has caused. 2 89 However, even if BP successfully
demonstrates that section 702 of the CLEAR Act singles out the
company, the bill will likely survive a constitutional challenge if it
furthers a "nonpunitive legislative purpose., 290 It is not hard to imagine
arguments that Section 702 serves such a purpose. One such argument
that proponents of the bill could make is that the purpose of the bill is to
ensure that taxpayers are not responsible for paying for injuries which
resulted from the oil spill caused by a private company.

282.
283.
284.

Meltz, supra note 72, at 7 (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. 425).
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.

285.

Id.

286.
287.

Id.

288.

Id.

289.
290.

Id.

156 CONG. REc. H6498 (daily ed. Jul. 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Holt).

SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 674 (9th Cir. 2002).
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VI. SUPREME COURT STANDS UP FOR THE BIG Guy, AT THE EXPENSE OF
THE AMERICAN WORKER

A. The Supreme Court Has Moved in a Decidedly Pro-Corporate
Interest Direction.
Particularly in the wake of the much maligned January 2010
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,29 1 many
observers have gone back to look at the Supreme Court's position when
one litigant in a case is either a major corporation or, indeed, the
"nation's largest business group," the US Chamber of Commerce.2 92 In
a study by the Constitutional Accountability Center, it was found that in
recent Supreme Court cases, "the Chamber won 68% of the cases in
which it had participated, [and] also that its success was drawn largely
along ideological lines: a cohesive, five-Justice conservative majority
voted for the Chamber 74% of the time, over 30 points more than had
the Court's moderate/liberal bloc. 293 The Chamber of Commerce often
weighs in on one side of cases pending at the Supreme Court, and the
Chamber then "participate[s] as either a party, or, more often, as an
amicus curiae, a 'friend of the court."'' 29 4 The position taken by the
Chamber of Commerce is always pro-business, in fact the Chamber's
slogan, "Fighting for your Business," is prominently plastered on their
291. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). In Citizens United, the Supreme Court "expanded corporate
campaign spending power by holding that, although '[t]he government can regulate corporate
political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements,' it is unconstitutional for the
government to suppress corporate political speech entirely. In doing so, the Court struck down...
previous decisions that limited the ability of corporations to spend money on electioneering
communications in federal elections." Breanne Gilpatrick, Removing CorporateCampaign Finance
Restrictions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 34 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 405,
405 (2011) (citing 130 S. Ct. at 886). This decision has been met with much criticism from the
legal community, already on its way to surpassing even the negative reaction to Eastern
Enterprises. See, e.g., id; Alexander Polikoff,, So How Did We Get Into This Mess? Observations
on the Legitamcy of Citizens United, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 203 (2011); Robert L. Kerr,
Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating Lochner's Error in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, 15 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 311 (2010).
292. See Mark Sherman, Supreme Court Favors Business, Study Says: Research Mirrors
Democrats' Stance on Picking Kagan, BOSTON GLOBE, June 11, 2010, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/06/11/supreme court favors busines
s studysays/.
293. Open for Business: Tracking the Chamber of Commerce's Supreme Court Success Rate
from the Burger Court through the Rehnquist Court and into the Roberts Court, Constitutional
Accountability
Ctr.
,
1
(Dec.
2010),
http://theusconstitution.org/blog.history/wpcontent/uploads/2010/12/Rehnquist-Chamber-Study- 12-17-10.pdf
[hereinafter
"Open
for
Business"].
294. Id.
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literature, including their website.2 95 Perhaps the fighting for your
business mantra has recently gone too far. The Chamber itself has
become so swept up by conservative interests, all in the name of
protecting American business, that the Chamber has been characterized
as blindly supporting countless conservative
causes, some with little
296
community.
business
the
on
specific effect
Some analysts have gone so far as to characterize the friendliness
with which the Supreme Court has bestowed upon the Chamber and
corporate interests as a throwback to the ever-reviled Lochner era.297 In
discussing the Citizens United decision as the contemporaneous
example, a study by the Constitutional Accountability Center noted:
The Lochner era lasted only as long as the Court continued to have five
Justices willing to sign on to its insupportable ideas. When the Court
changed, the Lochner-era precedents, and the idea that corporations
had the same fundamental rights as 'We the People,'
were quickly
29
disowned. Citizens United deserves a similar fate.
It shouldn't seem a stretch to extend the sentiment expressed in
opinions like the one quoted, and shared by the likes of President
Obama, 299 beyond the Citizens United decision and onto the general
behavior of the Supreme Court in their ever-increasing deference to
corporations. In fact, the Supreme Court has clearly moved in the

295. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.uschamber.com/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2011).
296. See Brad Friedman, Fox "News" Fans Flood Anti-U.S. Chamber Campaign with Death
Threats, Racial Attacks, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bradfriedman/fox-news-fans-flood-anti b 389276.html. The Fox News Fans' behavior came in reaction
to a liberal organization, the "Velvet Revolution" having put a $200,000 "bounty" out for the arrest
and conviction of Chamber of Commerce CEO Tom Donahue. See Judson Berger, Activist Group
Puts Bounty on Chamber of Commerce CEO, FOXNEWS.COM,
Dec. 7, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/12/07/liberal-group-offers-reward-information-chamberboss/.
297. See David H. Gans & Douglas T. Kendall, A Capitalist Joker: The Strange Origins,
DisturbingPast and Uncertain Future of CorporatePersonhoodin American Law, Constitutional
Accountability
Ctr,
2
(2010),
http://www.theusconstitution.org/upload/fck/file/File-storage/A%2OCapitalist%2Joker(1).pdf.
?phpMyAdmin=TzXZ91zqiNgbGqj5tqLH06F5Bxe.
298. Id.
299. See Darlene Superville, Obama Weekly Address VIDEO: PresidentBlasts Supreme Court
Over
Citizens
United
Decision,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
Jan.
23,
2010,
("Obama
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/23/obama-weekly-address-vide_n_434082.html
said [Citizens United] means public servants who stand up to Wall Street banks, oil companies,
health insurers and other powerful interests could find themselves under attack when election time
rolls around").
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direction of pro-corporations generally, as some recent studies have
shown. 300 This clear shift in ideology could be perceived as a warning
of the shape of things to come, that the Supreme Court may grasp at
opinions like the EasternEnterprises plurality in order to do the bidding
of corporations like BP.
B. How the Gulf Labor Force Will be Affected by the Supreme Court's
Pro-CorporateReaching
This Note considers the possible link between the Supreme Court's
current jurisprudence, corporate favoritism, and the retroactive nature of
a bill like the CLEAR Act, on a major corporation (BP) and a major
industry (oil). This Note contends that it is entirely possible that the
Supreme Court could extend their narrow Eastern Enterprises plurality
to invalidate provisions of the CLEAR Act if passed, and given the
Supreme Court's bent towards corporate interests, the current Court
would be acting wholly in concert with many of their recent 5-4
decisions, if they were to overturn the repeal of the damages cap that the
CLEAR Act provides.
While BP and their stockholders would be the potential victor in a
constitutional invalidation of the damages cap repeal, the victims of this
scenario would most likely be the labor force in the gulf region. Since
the OPA has no damages cap linked to cleanup efforts,3 1 purely
environmentally affected parties should be able to achieve some redress,
although even this may take many years. Workers in the Gulf, such as
fisherman, shrimpers, tourism and hospitality industry workers, could
potentially fall victim to a future litigation battle in which BP declares
their losses as illegitimate, thus negating BP's waiver of the damages
cap. Again, using the Exxon Valdez litigation history as a guide, this
Note contends that this very situation may not resolve itself for decades,
long after popular support for holding BP accountable has wavered.
The party left holding the bag will be the innocent workers in the
Gulf, stripped of their livelihoods through no fault of their own,
following the double whammy of Hurricane Katrina and the Deepwater

300. See Open for Business, supra note 293. For illustration the studies provide methodology
for their research, as well as some helpful charts that clearly show the positions taken by various
Justices and Courts regarding all cases in which the Department of Commerce appears as party or
amicus curiae. Id.

301. Nathan Richardson, Deepwater Horizon and the Patchworkof Oil Spill Liability Law 3
(Resources for the Future, May 2010), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-BCKRichardson-OilLiability.pdf.
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Horizon oil spill. And while responsibility for Katrina's damage may
fall only upon Mother Nature, with some possible exacerbation from
FEMA, there is a traceable party to hold responsible for compensating
the victims of the Gulf oil spill.
VII. CONCLUSION

Despite the feeling that has become pervasive in Congress, and
beyond to the public at large, that BP has been a (somewhat) responsible
corporate actor, stepped up to the plate and begun to take care of the
victims of the oil spill, this should serve as no excuse for congressional
acquiescence. While BP may have adopted a supposedly noble agenda,
one look at the tribulations of the Gulf labor force makes clear that
reform is still absolutely necessary.
BP and its supporters (stockholders, the Chamber of Commerce,
and other large oil conglomerates) may argue that its waiver has made
irrelevant the need to raise the damages cap, though future affected
communities may still need the protection that would come from passing
the CLEAR Act. It is easy to forget, that at the time of the Exxon
Valdez spill, the very idea of another spill that could be astronomically
larger in proportion and damage, wasn't even on legislators minds.
Shouldn't we learn from our mistakes, including those of a shortsighted
Congress? Just because the magnitude of the BP oil spill seemed
unrealistic to legislators in 1990, doesn't give today's elected officials in
Washington the right to ignore the possibility that the next oil spill to
come along may make the Gulf spill look like a drop of motor oil in a
street puddle.
Building upon the popular support for holding BP accountable, the
CLEAR Act (or similar legislation) should still be passed; and full
resistance to any legal challenge to the Act's retroactivity should be
mounted in order to ensure that the Supreme Court doesn't make the
grave mistake of overturning the Act's repeal of the damages cap.
EasternEnterprises' plurality was wrong, in much the same way that the
Lochner decision was wrong, and just like the jurisprudence coming
from the time following Lochner, the current Supreme Court's corporate
support will be looked back upon in the future as an aberration. Not
allowing the CLEAR Act to wallow in committee and perish, paired
with loud opposition to the corporate Court's agenda, may be the first
significant shot in the struggle against corporate dominance of the
American justice system, and the best shot that the labor force in the
Gulf has at being compensated for its enormous loss.
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